Семинары
15.03.2016. Очередное заседание научного семинара "Математическая экономика"
Очередное заседание семинара "Математическая экономика" (руководители - д.ф.-м.н. В.И.Данилов и академик В.М.Полтерович) состоится
во вторник, 15 марта 2016 г., в 11 часов 30 минут
Программа заседания:
Бажанов А.В. (Smith School of Business Queen's University, Canada)
Конкуренция с гарантией низкой цены при дальновидных покупателях
(по работе, выполненной совместно с Aviv Y. Olin Business School. Washington University in St. Louis, USA; Levin Y. и Nediak M. Smith School of Business, Queen's University, Canada)
Аннотация к докладу:
Resale price maintenance (RPM) is treated under the rule of reason in some of the US states after 2007 Supreme Court decision. MacKay&Smith (2014) argue, using simple demand models, that this decision has decreased consumer surplus because it increased prices of some products and decreased output. We consider a two-period model where the first-period price is fixed by RPM and resellers may endogenously decide to use another "collusion suspect," meet-the-competition clause with a most-favored-customer clause (MFC), to counteract strategic customer behavior.
We show that, as a result of MFC, the second-period (reduced) price increases, and total resellers' inventory decreases. However, customer surplus can increase in some cases and the aggregate welfare increases in the majority of market situations. MFC can not only decrease the losses in welfare and resellers' profits due to strategic customers but, under reseller competition, may even lead to higher levels of these values than with myopic customers, i.e., to gains from increased strategic behaviour.
On the other hand, MFC and strategic behaviour may result in "MFC-traps" for resellers, i.e., multiple equilibria are possible where one of the equilibria yields a gain from increased strategic behaviour while another results in a reseller profit less than the worst profit in any equilibrium without MFC. With growing competition, the benefits or losses from MFC can be essentially higher than the losses from strategic customer behavior.
We show that, as a result of MFC, the second-period (reduced) price increases, and total resellers' inventory decreases. However, customer surplus can increase in some cases and the aggregate welfare increases in the majority of market situations. MFC can not only decrease the losses in welfare and resellers' profits due to strategic customers but, under reseller competition, may even lead to higher levels of these values than with myopic customers, i.e., to gains from increased strategic behaviour.
On the other hand, MFC and strategic behaviour may result in "MFC-traps" for resellers, i.e., multiple equilibria are possible where one of the equilibria yields a gain from increased strategic behaviour while another results in a reseller profit less than the worst profit in any equilibrium without MFC. With growing competition, the benefits or losses from MFC can be essentially higher than the losses from strategic customer behavior.
Обратите внимание, что 8 марта семинара не будет в связи с праздником.
Семинары проходят в здании ЦЭМИ РАН по адресу: Нахимовский проспект 47, 5 этаж, аудитория 520.
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