Семинары

The phenomenon of group identity, thoroughly studied in sociology and recently introduced into economic literature, has important effects on decision-making in a range of situations. In particular, it can improve cooperation within groups. This lab experiment studies how effective is group identity compared to traditional monetary incentives, and whether these instruments complement or substitute each other. We study the subjects’ behaviour in a public good game, varying the strength of group identity (between groups) and the presence of monetary incentives (within groups). We demonstrate that while both group identity and monetary incentives are effective per se, their combination does not further improve cooperation. This result may be tentatively explained by the crowding-out of image motivation by extrinsic incentives, but for a more definite answer further investigation is needed. We demonstrate that expectations are and important channel that mediates the effect of group identity on cooperation. Unlike previous studies, we find a significant difference in expectations regarding other group members’ contributions between groups with high and low identity. Moreover, members of high-identity groups overestimate the effect of introduction of monetary incentives. Our findings suggest that boosting group identity and providing monetary incentives may be substitute instruments for improving group cooperation and one should be careful when applying both of them simultaneously.

Семинары проходят в здании ЦЭМИ РАН по адресу: Нахимовский проспект 47, 5 этаж, аудитория 520.

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