

NMD DEPLOYMENT AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY: GEOECONOMIC ASPECTS

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It is shown that the US NMD deployment, without considering geoeconomic and geopolitical questions of global stability, will result in an uncontrollable acceleration of the arms race. The most effective direction of development, in the opinion of the author, is the joining of efforts by the countries with powerful military, scientific, and technological potential, so to decrease risks of global instability. Large attention is paid to the preservation of a strategic role by Russia in maintaining global stability and on the necessity of allocation of appropriate resources for this purpose by the most developed countries.

AGGRAVATION OF GEOPOLITICAL PROBLEMS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE XXI CENTURY

Instability of the unipolar world in the period of globalization

At present a worsening of the conditions ensuring global stability is observed. The most important factors stimulating this process are as follows:

- Collapse of the bipolar and establishment of the unipolar world system as a result of political and economic changes in East-European countries and the USSR,
- Complication in maintaining global stability under conditions of a unipolar world system,
- Higher rates of economic growth and increase of military potential in the greatest (by population) developing countries,
- Changing demographic situation due to the high growth of population in developing countries and its stabilization or reduction in the most developed countries,
- Decrease of efficiency in the control of weapons proliferation, first of all, of nuclear weapons proliferation.

It is necessary to take also into account, that in the unipolar world there is a danger of using double standards and elaborating decisions made by a country-leader that may contradict international norms and standards. History shows, that even the most

developed states that wish to protect or establish democratic society in other countries may violate the democratic principles using double standards, or unfairly applying force though it could be possible to resolve problems by discussion. Thus the risk of acceptance of wrong decisions, that may lead to the negative geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences as well as to significant losses in long-term perspective, grows. Particular decisions accepted by one country without taking into account all interrelated problems of global stability may represent a serious danger, because their realization can stimulate uncontrollable arms race in the world.

The situation is aggravated by uncontrolled flows of capital between countries due to the globalization of the economy that, with an opportunity of using nontransparent offshore zones, are incompatible with goals of global stability and create conditions for corruption as well as facilitate broadening spheres of the international mafia's influence. All these problems considerably complicate the control of weapons proliferation. Obviously, new ideas in the field of geopolitics and geoeconomics, and possibly geodefense, aimed at maintaining global stability on the basis of multipolar world system, are urgently needed.

Changing regional structure of the world military expenditures

After collapse of the USSR and the end of the cold war the annual world military expenditures have decreased in 1988-1997 by 34% (estimated on the basis of the SIPRI data [i]). The basic share of this decrease concerns the period of 1990-1991 due to the sharp reduction of military expenditures in countries of the CIS - former republics of the USSR as well as in the East European countries. Thus in 1992 the world military expenditures were lower than in 1990 approximately by 20 % or 200 bln doll. and their decrease in the European countries including the USSR and then Russia was equal to 168 bln doll. (in 1997 the military expenditures in Russia and countries of the CIS were equal approximately only to 10 % of ones of the former USSR in 1988), and to 28 bln doll. in the USA.

In the second half of the 1990-s the reduction of the annual world military expenditures practically has stopped (their value is equal to about 700 bln doll. in 1995 prices). However there are significant changes in the regional structure of military expenditures due to their decrease in the USA and Europe and increase in Asia and the Middle East as well as the South America. In 1988-1997 the share of North America and Europe (including the former USSR and then countries of the CIS) in the annual world military expenditures has decreased by 14,1 percentage items (p.i.) from 85,4 % to 71,3 % (from 910 bln. doll. in 1988 to 502 bln doll. in 1997). At the same period the share of Asia, Middle East and South America has increased by 1,83 times (or by 11,9 p.i.) - from 14,4 % up to 26,3 % (153,8 bln doll. up to 185,2 bln. doll.). The real growth of the annual military expenditures was equal in Asia to 26 %, in Middle East (without Iraq) to 9 %, and in South America to 14 % (estimated by the SIPRI data).

A great danger for peace is the desire of countries with the greatest population, first of all China, India, and Pakistan to increase their nuclear arsenals. At the same time it is necessary also to pay attention to significant growth of military potential of some countries - members of the NATO (though they have not nuclear weapons), first of all,

Turkey that has announced two years ago a program of rearmament and modernization of its military industry. The cost will be equal to 150 bln. doll. for 30 years [ii]. The militarization of Turkey represents the greatest danger for Russia as the number of Turkish military forces is only in 1,5 times less than the Russian ones. Now the number of military men on 1 sq. km of the Turkish territory is approximately about 14 times, and on 1 km of its land borders about 4-5 times more than in Russia; 4 % of Turkish manpower are engaged in the military forces, so Turkey can concentrate significant forces on its Northern borders with countries of the CIS.

Thus, it is possible to speak about the beginning of a new stage of arms race characterized by reduction of military expenditures in the most developed countries and their growth in the countries of Asia, Middle East and South America. In these three regions, first of all in the countries of Asia, there is an aspiration to possess nuclear weapon.

Main groups of countries that are concerned by the US NMD deployment

For analysis of geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences connected with revision of the ABM Treaty, it is necessary to allocate some groups of countries, as follows:

- countries which have signed the ABM Treaty (the USA and Russia) as well as countries supporting it (countries of the West Europe, first of all, Great Britain, France, Germany),
- countries that have not been involved in the Treaty and are actively increasing their military potential (first of all, China),
- countries that are compelled to increase their military potential after the more active actors (India and other countries).

Under conditions of the ABM Treaty the militarization of countries of the second and third groups was constrained. Revision of the Treaty, on the contrary, eliminates constraining political factors for countries of the second group and compels countries of the third group to participate more actively in the arms race. For these countries the increased demand on financial and, first of all, scientific and technological resources is typical. Time becomes for them a very important resource. Economy of time at the expense of exclusion of the first stage of life cycle of weapon systems by purchases of the research and development (R&D) results, licenses, and know-how become priority directions of activities on the world market of weapons for countries of the second and third groups. This opportunity allows them to accelerate the growth of military potential considerably.

The time needed by countries that are increasing their military potential to reach the level of countries-leaders (the USA, Russia, etc.), can be possibly estimated by comparing, for example, the dynamics of growth of the American and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals. The lag between them in 1960-1980 was equal approximately to 15-20 years (estimated by data from [iii]). Obviously, an access of developing countries to the R&D results of military technology leaders may decrease this lag by several times.

NMD as a source of escalation of the offensive arms race

It is necessary to examine questions connected with the ABM Treaty as a part of considerably wider problem, namely the long-term maintenance of global stability that embraces not only restriction of arms production, control, as well as nonproliferation of arms, and deployment of defense, etc. (see, e.g. [iv]), but also general problems of geopolitics, geoeconomics and geofinances.

The basic external problems connected with the US NMD deployment are determined by the real threat of fostering development of offensive. It is important to note, that after revision of the first and other chapters of the ABM Treaty by one of the parties, the second party will be, obviously, released from requirement of the chapter IX that speaks that each of the parties do not transfer to other states antimissile weapons or their components and do not give to other states the descriptions or drawings specially developed for creation of missile defense systems and their components that are limited by the Treaty. Thus, it is possible to expect that restrictions on distribution of new weapons will be considerably weakened, for example, those concerning multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), a number of warheads, etc.) [v, vi], as well as military doctrines of the countries, first of all, those that possess or wish to have the nuclear weapons will be changed.

Federation of American Scientists released in July 2000 a letter to President signed by 50 American Nobel laureates in the sciences stating that ABM systems, "particularly those attempting to intercept reentry vehicles in space, will inevitably lose in an arms race of improvements to offensive missiles" [vii]. In this connection it is possible to remind the words of two Ministers of Defense. Thus, R. McNamara told in 1966 after deployment of the antiballistic missile (ABM) defense system in the USSR: "a natural answer of the USA to your ABM system becomes escalating ours offensive arms... Deployment of the Soviet ABM system will result in arms race" [iii, p.58]. And recently Minister of Defense of Russia I. Sergueev said the same: "NMD deployment will initiate a chain reaction of competition between defensive and offensive weapons; modernization of offensive weapons costs much less and takes much less time comparatively with NMD system" [viii].

FACTORS STIMULATING DEPLOYMENT OF US MND

Role of the economic and technological factors in stimulating the US NMD deployment

A need in the NMD for protection of the USA against terrorists and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threats from developing countries is supported also with the following economic and technological factors:

- a desire of a country-leader to strengthen its technological and military advantage by using available resources and reserve of time,
- termination of the life cycle of many American weapon systems that were produced in the end of 1970 - beginning of 1980-s (it was marked in the report of the

President Clinton [ix]);

- high level of precision weapons for interception of missiles as well as of main technical decisions for the NMD deployment;
- accumulation of significant investment resources during the last decade,
- necessity of periodical modernization of the huge production potential of military firms,
- restructuring of military manufacturing in the USA,
- certain expectations of a new impulse for increasing innovative activity in civil industry that may give defensive R&D, and for bringing closer military and civil sectors of manufacturing.

It is known the following law for a business cycle: during economic growth the relative increase of expenditures for R&D should provide at the next stage the growth of production of new goods and acceleration of using new technologies (situation typical now of the USA).

The analysis shows that the economic, scientific and technological preconditions for transition to the next cycle of development and deployment of new weapon systems in the USA are prepared. The high probability of beginning of this process already in a near future is proved by the analysis of dynamics of expenditures on military R&D in 1990-s.

The share of expenditures on military R&D and tests (RDT&E) in total expenditures of the DOD in the middle of 1990-s has increased substantially despite of decreasing absolute volumes of expenditures (from 10,9 % in 1985 and 12,4 % in 1990 up to 14,1 % in 1997). The significant change of structure of military expenditures was characterized by the growth of ratio of expenditures on RDT&E to procurements of arms from 32,3 % in 1985 and 44,8 % in 1990 up to 79,2 % in 1995 and 84,8 % in 1997 (see table). At the same time the value military RDT&E changed from an average level in 1995-2000 not more than on $\pm 4\%$ in current prices. These data show, on the one hand, the great attention of the US government to military R&D, and from the other hand the high probability of significant increase of future production of new weapons that will be produced on the basis of R&D results received in 1990-2000.

In this situation a significant increase of lobbying is observed. As The New York Times reported, "the arms industry has spent \$49 million in campaign contributions to Washington politicians and an additional \$2 million in a more subtle and indirect campaign they say has helped create an atmosphere in which the pressure to build an anti-missile system weighs heavily on both parties." [x]

	1987	1990	1995	1999	2000	2001	2005
Military RDT&E expenditures, bln. doll	48,8	43,5	37,0	38,1	34,4	33,9	30,9
Share of RDT&E in the DOD expenditures, %	12,3	11,8	13,1	14,1	12,7	12,0	11,0
Share of RDT&E in procurement, %	44,2	45,9	80,3	76,2	64,9	55,5	45,3

Military RDT&E expenditures and its share in total expenditures of the US Ministry of Defense (DOD) in 2000 prices [xi].

These data show that it is very difficult to stop the process. However it is necessary to note, that economic and technological basis is prepared in the USA much better than effective geopolitical strategy for conditions of the unipolar world. At present there is

no, apparently, a well-grounded study of geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences of NMD deployment and this fact aggravates the danger of global instability growth.

The lack of the US long-term strategy

Apparently, the desire of the USA to destroy communist regime in the former USSR and to weaken its military power was not based on well elaborated long-term strategy and plans, firstly, for its further effective participation in construction of new political and economic system in Russia, and, secondly, that is very important, for utilization of the large Russian potential to maintain global stability.

Possibly, the USA operated under the doctrine that was developed at the very beginning of the "cold war" and proposed (in distinction from the Marshall's plan for Europe or plan of Dodge for Japan after the Second World War) the avoidance of a responsibility for consequences caused by possible change of political situation in Russia as well as the minimization of necessary economic aid. As it was written in the US government document prepared in 1948 "it is necessary... to disagree with conditions concerned with responsibility for correction of inevitable political, economic and social changes" [xii].

Under conditions of the bipolar world the global stability was provided at the expense of increase of military potential of both parties that resulted in exhaustion of economic potential and collapse of one party. However after economic exhaustion of one side two scenarios are possible.

According to the first one the full elimination of nuclear weapons and missile arsenals of the exhausted party is necessary as well as maximum decreasing its economic and technological potential (this scenario is very near to proposals of Z. Brzezinski [xiii]). In that case the winning party (that is the USA) should be a leader, at least, in foreseeable long-run perspective. Obviously, for realization of this variant a constant maintenance of a gap between the country-leader and other countries is necessary. Unfortunately, it is hardly possible for a large time period. As it is correctly underlined in [xiv], the efficiency of such guarantee depends on military, political, and economic power. Taking into account that rates of the US GDP growth in 1981-2000 were by 2-3 times and even more less than in developing countries, it is possible to forecast a gradually decrease of the relative economic superiority of the USA that will soon force them to attract resources of other countries for maintaining global stability. At such scenario the weakened second party (in this case Russia) will be compelled to use any means for its survival.

There is, in our opinion, the more effective scenario, namely utilization of resources of the second party for future joint maintenance of global stability. Obviously, in this case a significant economic aid to the second party should be given to help it to leave from crisis (in the certain sense this is some analogue of plan of Marshall) and to strengthen its economic potential to avoid proliferation of its arms and military R&D in the third countries. The conditions of such aid should be discussed in detail along with possible revision of the ABM Treaty. By this scenario, the growth of joint potential of countries ensuring efficiency of joint limited missile defense system can be obtained and a probability of maintenance of a high level of global stability will be increased.

Underestimation of the Russian role for maintaining global stability. Low level of responsibility

Unfortunately, in the USA there is no yet understanding the basic role of Russia for stability in the Eurasian region and the necessity of its economic potential growth. The main attention is paid, as 10 years ago, to arms control and disarmament, management of these processes and etc. that, however, despite of their importance, are tactical and not strategic problems. At the end of 1980-s and in the beginning of 1990-s the decision of tactical problems was the most urgent task, but now the main attention have to be given to the long-term strategy of maintaining of global stability, first of all, in the Eurasian region.

At present, a significant underestimation of value of the aid that is necessary for Russia is typical of the American experts. Simultaneously there is a large exaggeration of size of the credits given to Russia during transition.

It is possible to give several typical examples.

Thus, Russia has an enormous stock of plutonium. If we remind, that it was supposed to pay about 5 bln doll. to the North Korea that have 10-15 kg of plutonium for cancellation of its nuclear program, then for Russia, with its more than 100 tons or 100 000 kg of plutonium the total payment should be much higher and equal to many hundreds billions doll.

The US officials that discuss the program of optimization (i.e. conversion) of enormous nuclear complex of Russia have estimated that its cost could be about 1 bln doll, (approximately 10 thous. doll. for creation of one new workplace multiplied by 100 thousand workers that have to change their profession) [xv]. Our analysis shows that in this case the required expenditures were considerably underestimated.

The main problem connected with such conversion is proliferation of knowledge, R&D results, and know-how of Russian specialists to the third countries. Now it is very difficult to ensure real nonproliferation because of the very low monthly wages of specialists and scientists that in average do not exceed 60-70 doll. in R&D as a whole and about 200 doll. in some enterprises of the nuclear industry. That is for obtaining the reliable guarantee of the R&D nonproliferation it is necessary to pay to Russian nuclear specialists about 800-1000 doll. per month (this level is significantly less than in the USA and other developed countries). That is in this case the additional allocations equal to approximately 0,6-0,9 bln doll. per year are required. Obviously, these payments should be made during the large period, probably, 10 years till the average wages in Russia will be increased up to the appropriate level. Hence, the total cost of the program should be increased by 6-9 bln doll., that is it must be by 7-10 times higher than estimations made by American officials.

The next typical example - conclusions made in the work [xvi], where the author believes, that it is necessary to force Russia to stop its deliveries of weapons to China as, from his opinion, the economic aid of the USA to Russia exceeds the Russian income from this export.

Unfortunately, the author does not take into account that the economic aid of the USA to Russia is rather small for huge Russian economy and that the slow down of its GDP in 1990-1998 considerably exceeds the decrease of the GDP in the USA during crisis of 1929-1933: (-42,3%) in Russia and (-25,6%) in the USA.

In 1992-1997 Russia has received from the IMF and World Bank 18,3 bln doll. [xvii]. In the same period the total export of Russian weapons was equal approximately to 17 bln doll. Only in 1998-1999 the export of weapons has given to Russia about 5,7 bln doll. [i, xviii, xix, xx].

From 1992 to 1998 the economic assistance for Russia from the U.S. government constituted only \$ 5.45 billion in total (for denuclearization, economic reform, and humanitarian projects) including \$ 2,1 billion to increase the security of Russian nuclear weapons, material, and personnel. However even these rather small allocations were used mainly by western contractors - firms that develop and manufacture the technologies for liquidation of arms. There were not practically investments in infrastructure, first of all, for social needs of population. That is why from 40 thousand tons of chemical weapons was liquidated less than 1 ton [xxi, xxii].

Thus, the US experts, on the one hand, underestimate economic importance of export of weapons for Russia, and from the other hand essentially exaggerate the value of the US aid. They do not take into account that a 100 percent decreasing export of the Russian weapons is connected with necessity to create the appropriate number of workplaces for highly skilled specialists of the military industry. For example a reduction of export of weapons by 40% will lead, as our estimates show, to conversion of workplaces for about 20-25% workers engaged in military industry, i.e. for 500-700 thousand workers approximately (in 1999 the share of military production in the Russian military industry was equal to 54,3 % of total output and 37,3% of it was exported [xix]). That is for elimination of the Russian export and partial conversion of the military industry it is necessary to allocate resources in 5-7 times more than for conversion of nuclear complex (as was mentioned earlier).

At present the aid to Russia can be compared with the discussed now value of aid to Argentina (about 15 bin doll.) with population by more than 4 times lower [xxiii]. Unfortunately, such a small value of aid in connection with ideas of Washington consensus [xxiv] lead to greater destruction of the Russian economy and in total promote increasing instability in the Eurasian region.

Now some American experts begin to understand, as a Congressional study has concluded, that "Western powers gave ... billions of dollars in aid to Russia with no comprehensive strategy, and, at least partly as a result, the programs failed to bring about the desired capitalist transition there;... the aid programs failed to build robust capitalist institutions or produce sustained economic growth in Russia" [xxv]. It is necessary to remind the words of well known financier G. Soros who told that Western democracies carry the basic share of responsibility for the destiny of Russia because they were ready to help Russia by words and not by money [xxvi, xxvii].

In this connection it is expedient to mention the following citation from the report of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: "Cooperative threat reduction, which accounts for less than one quarter of 1 percent of the U.S. defense budget, is an extraordinarily cost-effective investment in enhancing U.S. security." [xxi, p.14]. Unfortunately, it is necessary to recognize, that the pleasure that US officials receive from such a high efficiency reminds very strongly feelings of merchants who, in the last centuries, exchanged (with the same effectiveness!) mountains of valuable furs, obtained by the Northern fur-hunters, for a bottle of spirit or bright trinkets.

FROM NMD TO A LIMITED GLOBAL MISSILE DEFENSE. ROLE OF RUSSIA IN MAINTENANCE OF GLOBAL STABILITY

A limited global system of defense

At present there are many proposals in Russia for a constructive cooperation in creation of limited missile defense system due to existence of a serious threat of missile-nuclear terrorism. This cooperation could promote simultaneously economical growth of Russia at the expense of the US orders for military production. In opinion of some Russian experts Russia may agree for revision of the ABM Treaty "only in exchange of agreements on participation of Russia in creation of elements of American limited missile defense system and European non-strategic missile defense" [xxviii, p. 11]. According to this point of view, Russia (under conditions of an inevitable revision of the ABM Treaty) has, firstly, to think over changes in the Treaty aimed at preservation of arms race both defensive and offensive, and secondly, to achieve the certain concessions from the USA, including ones in the framework of the START II and START III treaties. The basis for compromise should be the maintenance of global stability logic [xxix]. The main direction of the Russian-American cooperation could be the deployment of limited or nonstrategical missile defense. It is possible also to think over all-European non-strategic missile defense [viii].

The idea of construction of a limited global system of defense (GMD) was proposed in January 1992 by President Eltsin and was discussed in 1992-1993. The GMD was proposed "for protection of world community against the limited threats of missiles and it must be capable to reveal sources of danger, to prevent beginning of nuclear war, and also to react against any aggressor. It also includes a complex of collective restrictive measures, international control system for the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology as well as their tests and deployments", etc. [xxx, p. 13-14]. It is necessary to underline that creation of the GMD should result in mutual political and economic benefit of the USA (by estimations of the Ballistic Missiles Defense Office (BMDO) and Congressional Budget Office (CBO) the total expenditures on the NMD program should be about 50 bln doll., but the final cost of the program may be much higher [xxxi]) as well as of Russia and other nuclear countries. Different variants of the GMD were proposed also by American experts (see also [xxxii], where a proposal for construction of joint American and Russian ballistic missile defense (BMD) system was considered).

Increasing aid to Russia for maintaining global stability

Russia, that lays between countries of various culture, religion, and level of development, can play a key role in stabilization of situation. However it is possible only when its economic potential grows. Otherwise weak Russia becomes the center of desires of other countries due to its huge territory and resources, and subsequently the source of instability in the largest Eurasian region (e.g., the Russian ambassador A. Adamishin underlines that the basic problems of Russia...may have dangerous geopolitical consequences first of all in Siberia and Far East [xxxiii]). In this case the extremely large efforts of the USA and other countries of NATO for prevention of the global conflict, which can be transformed to the third world war, will be required. It is

possible to expect that expenditures of the NATO countries for stabilization of probable conflicts in the region will cost many hundreds billions dollars excluding direct and indirect losses.

It is clear, that under existing economic conditions of Russia the problems of maintenance of global stability in the Eurasian region will be aggravated considerably. It is very easy to agree with the statement of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, that "today the threat stems more from Russia's weakness" [xxxiv, p. 10]. If the situation does not change the USA should apply tremendous efforts to maintain stability in the large region in the near future.

Macroeconomic estimates show that for effective stabilization of situation on its borders the Russian military expenditures should be not less than 5-6% GDP [xxxv, xxxvi, xxxvii]. In 1998-1999 they were about 3% GDP. The necessity of increasing the share of military expenditures in the GDP for maintenance of stability in the huge Eurasian region will inevitably result in curtailing democratic reforms and delaying transition to market economy.

In this connection it is necessary to consider the problem of significant increasing aid to Russia with the purposes of long-term maintenance of stability in the Eurasian region. In this case Russia could accept the definite obligations for maintenance of global stability and continuation of democratic reforms. The approximate estimations show that the minimal size of this aid should be about 20-25 bln doll annually (mainly as direct investments) during 10-15 years.

The Western countries should understand the inevitability of large expenditures for maintenance of global stability and their own peaceful development. At the same time they have to take into account that these additional expenditures for maintenance of stability in the Eurasian region by Russia will be equal approximately only to 3% of total world military expenditures or 4,4% of the NATO countries' military expenditures in 1999 prices.

CONCLUSION

The revision of the ABM Treaty and deployment of the US NMD system will result in growth of the numbers of missiles in other countries and also will give an impulse for increasing global instability. That is why the elaboration of strategy of global stability maintenance is urgent.

The new more complex approach for revision of the ABM Treaty have to be concentrated first of all on the problems of maintenance of global stability. The new Treaty should obviously to be concerned, besides problems of the NMD deployment and reduction of arms, mainly with geoeconomic and geofinancial problems, including definite limitations of the export of capital, international control of functioning offshore zones, etc. for all countries.

The optimal decision of the NMD problem can be obtained only with taking into account the more complex task of maintaining global stability. Apparently in the long run there is a keen need for deployment of mutual global missile defense system with participation of the USA, Russia and other nuclear countries. The deployment of a limited or non-strategic missile defense could be the first stage of this activity. The

global control and the mutual cooperation in creating a global missile and missile-technology control system could be one of the first elements of this system. As it was said by the Russian Foreign Minister I.Ivanov, it will strengthen as well the Missile Technology Control Regime by providing links between its members and non members [xxxviii].

Obviously, the public opinion and officials of the most developed countries, first of all, the USA should realize an aggravation of threat of global conflicts with weak economic potential of Russia. This threat can be eliminated only by substantial and mainly direct investments of the Western countries in reconstruction of the Russian economy.

NOTES

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