Polterovich V.M. Privatization and
the
Rational Ownership Structure. Part 1. Privatization: the Problem of
Efficiency. // Economics of
contemporary Russia 2012. ¹4
(59) Ñ.1-7.
The paper considers
the problem of public sector governance, aimed to rationalize the
structure of
ownership in an economy. The first part of the paper
includes a brief overview
of the theory of privatization. Arguments of supporters and opponents
of
privatization are compared with the results of privatization campaigns
in
developing countries as well as in developed ones, including their
recent and
past experience. The costs and possible benefits of privatization are
analyzed,
focusing on the current Russian conditions. The analysis suggests that
these
costs and benefits depend on the quality of state governance and the
quality
of
market; the efficiency of privatization increases in both variables.
Negative
influence of privatization campaigns on both, enterprise efficiency and
economic
growth, is observed in developing countries more often than in
developed ones. Thus, the decisions on privatization have to be
considered in
the context of
a more general problem, that is of finding a rational property
structure in an economy.
Keywords: Sappington–Stiglitz
theorem,
transformation cost, state governance quality, market quality, rational
ownership
structure.
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