Tsurikov
V.I. Incomplete Contracting, Including
Transaction Costs and the Corruption
Element. Part 2.
// Economics of
contemporary Russia 2010. ¹4
(51) Ñ.8-13.
Impact of contractual
performance costs and the corruption element of the institutional
environment,
incentives for investment in creation of value and the overall social
benefits
is analyzed within the context of incomplete contract model. Comparison
of
efficiency of discrete institutional alternatives in terms of
transaction
benefits and costs advantages is undertaken. Controversial role of
corruption
and its distorting impact on the national economy structure, i.e.
creation of
artificial competitive edge for some economic projects and financial
barriers
for others is demonstrated.
Keywords:
incomplete
contract, transaction costs, specific investments, limited rationality,
opportunistic behavior, stimuli, corruption.
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