Tsurikov
V.I. Incomplete Contracting, Including Transaction Costs and the
Corruption
Element. Part 1.
// Economics of
contemporary Russia 2010. ¹3
(50) Ñ.27-39.
Impact
of contractual performance costs and the corruption element of the
institutional environment, incentives for investment in creation of
value and
the overall social benefits is analyzed within the context of
incomplete
contract model. Comparison of efficiency of discrete institutional
alternatives
in terms of transaction benefits and costs advantages is undertaken.
Controversial role of corruption and its distorting impact on the
national
economy structure, i.e. creation of artificial competitive edge for
some
economic projects and financial barriers for others is demonstrated.
Keywords:
incomplete contract, transaction costs, specific investments,
limited
rationality, opportunistic behavior, stimuli, corruption.
Contents
Back
to home page